1
Proposals for the reform of inheritance taxation of trusts can only be considered in the wider context of inheritance tax. Recasting: Donee rather than donor basis of assessment.
5
International practice differs dramatically.
6
IHT is a tax with many opportunities for avoidance/mitigation of which 6.1 lifetime gifts and 6.2 100% agricultural/business property relief are only the most obvious.
7
Very considerable resources go into IHT mitigation/avoidance.
8
Mirrlees describes IHT as: 8.1 "a half-hearted tax" 8. 2 "subject to charges of unfairness" 8. 3 "a principled defence of the current IHT is difficult" 8.4
"Does not stack up well against any reasonable set of principles for the design of a tax on inherited wealth". 8.5
"Something of a mess". 8.6
"Falls disproportionately on the middle classes to the benefit of the rich". 
12
In particular abolition of IHT would facilitate improvement of CGT:
12.1 Abolition of the CGT uplift on death.
12.2 A gift to a discretionary trust would be a PET, so one could also repeal hold-over relief on gift to discretionary trusts.
13
This illustrates an important point about capital taxation reform. The repeal of IHT makes possible an extension of CGT which at present is limited by the desire to avoid double taxation -in the form of CGT & IHT charged on the same event. This mitigates the cost of repeal -it may be revenue raising.
14 Countries in which an IHT has been abolished include the Canadian and Australian jurisdictions.
Requirements of a satisfactory system of trust taxation: the equality criteria
15
In the UK:
"The government recognises the important role trusts play in society and has said that as far as possible it wants a tax system for trusts that does not provide artificial incentives to set up a trust, but equally avoids artificial obstacles to the use of trusts where their use would bring significant non-tax benefits."
Quite so. Similarly in Australia:
"The Government considers that, where used appropriately, trusts are a legitimate structure through which Australians should be able to conduct their personal and business affairs -not a form of tax avoidance." 3 17 I refer to this as "the trusts equality criteria".
18
This is looking at the matter from the position of settlors and beneficiaries. However there is also a public aspect. Under a trust, it will normally be the case that one or more trustees with no personal interest in the trust have responsibility for paying tax. This offers an advantageous system for tax collection in that there is a neutral party who has a duty to the Crown. Standards of compliance are generally higher in relation to trust property than other property. Mark Herbert QC makes the same point in his lecture quoting Robert (now Lord) Walker:
Trustees are the PAYE-gatherers of capital taxation, with no personal financial interest in avoiding the taxes for which they are personally liable, and the very high degree of compliance with the system must owe a lot to their conscientiousness. If settlements are discouraged by discriminatory legislation, unlawful evasion of tax must be expected to increase.
4
Does IHT meet the trusts equality criteria?
19
There is a disparity between trusts and individuals in that: 19.1 A gift to an individual is a PET (tax free if the donor survives 7 years). 19.2 A gift to a trust is a chargeable transfer.
20
There is a further disparity in that: 20.1 An individual's property is subject to tax on his death (subject to the spouse exemption). 20.2 Trust property is subject to 10 year and exit charges, which amount (over a lifetime) to a much more onerous regime. It may be suggested that IHT trust charges of up to 6% each 10 years are less onerous than lifetime charges of up to 40% once a generation. But the IHT trust charges are paid sooner, and have no gift exemption and no spouse exemption, so their burden is unquestionably much greater.
6
In particular, a gift to another individual may qualify for the spouse/civil partner exemption: the termination of an IPDI will not usually do so unless the trust then comes to an end. There is a social cost in that the benefits of trusts are not currently available to the public. 
26
Having decided on a reform one naturally tends to put forward all possible arguments in support.
27
One is naturally tempted put forward bad arguments in support as well. "Laws, like sausages, cease to inspire respect in proportion as we know how they are made." (John Godfrey Saxe, misattributed to Bismarck).
28
Erroneous arguments propounded by those putting through the new law (which the proponents themselves may or may not have believed) include the following: 28.1 The changes "aligned" the formerly "privileged" tax treatment of IP and A&M trusts with the "normal" "mainstream" tax regime for discretionary trusts. 7 In fact, substantial discretionary trusts, i.e. those paying any substantial IHT, were exceptional. The Select Committee on Treasury concluded:
With respect to the new rules on the tax treatment of accumulation and maintenance and interest in possession trusts, we are concerned that estimates of the expected numbers of affected trusts vary so widely between Government and practitioners. If the Government's estimate, that the new rules will affect "only a very small number of very wealthy people" is correct, then the Government needs to provide much more detailed information about its estimates, in order to allay taxpayer and industry concerns. We are concerned that a legitimate measure designed to reduce tax avoidance may penalise trusts established to protect family members and consider that the issue merits further consideration. We recommend that the Government provide detailed information about how it has arrived at its estimate that the new rules on the tax treatment of certain trusts will affect only "a minority of a minority" of 100,000 discretionary trusts. This information should be provided There was a good reason for this. The discretionary trust regime was designed in 1982 to impose on discretionary trusts a burden roughly equal to the burden of capital transfer tax on non-settled property. It achieved that. In 1986, CTT was then replaced by the much lighter IHT regime, under which tax was no longer charged on lifetime gifts. There is no obvious solution as to how to deal with discretionary trusts under an IHT regime. The solution adopted was to retain the old CTT rules, which then imposed a burden on discretionary trusts rather greater than that which applied to non-settled property, but allowing the alternative route of IP trusts (and A&M trusts) which were, broadly, treated in the same way as non-settled property. Thus the charges on discretionary trusts had something of the nature of anti-avoidance provisions. Although the tax charge could be unduly high, that did not matter because nobody needed to pay it, and almost no-one actually did. The way ahead
32
The inheritance taxation of trusts can only be considered in the context of inheritance tax as a whole.
33
I make the following proposal on the basis of a reform which will fit into the existing inheritance taxation of trusts. If inheritance tax changed, the inheritance taxation of trusts would also have to change. But this is not the occasion to discuss broader changes to IHT.
Inheritance taxation of gifts to trusts
34 All gifts to trusts should in principle 12 be PETs. This taxes trusts on the same basis as gifts to an individual. In slightly more detail: As for PETs, the transfer would be exempt to the extent that the transfer is attributable to property which becomes comprised in the estate of another person or trust or to the extent that the value of the estate of another person or trust is increased. 
Inheritance taxation of trust property

Postscript
40
The above was written in October 2012. A further harshening of the taxation of discretionary trusts is proposed in 2015. 16 There is again no attempt to achieve a parity of treatment between settled and non-settled property. For trusts:
The broad aim of the relevant property trust charges is to ensure the equivalent of a full IHT charge [ie 40%] is paid on [settled] property once in every generation (30 years).
41
Non-settled property does not bear IHT at anything like that rate, even once a lifetime, because of the scope to make gifts and generationskipping transfers (among other reasons).
42
The proposed reform will restrict all trusts made by one settlor to a single nil rate band and impose "a simple rate of 6%" after that. Then the IHT burden on trust property in excess of the single NRB will greatly exceed the burden on non-trust property. But the door to using lifetime trusts was (more or less) nailed shut in 2006, so this additional change will not make a significant difference. The consultation paper understandably anticipates the exchequer impact to be "negligible". 
